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Abstract:  
This paper analyses the effects of the Initial Public Offering (IPO) market on real investment 
decisions in emerging industries. We first propose a model of IPO timing based on divergence 
of opinion among investors and short-sale constraints. Using a real option approach, we show 
that firms are more likely to go public when the ratio of overvaluation over profits is high, 
that is after stock market run-ups. Because initial returns increase with the demand from 
optimistic investors at the time of the offer, the model provides an explanation for the 
observed positive causality between average initial returns and IPO volume. Second, we 
discuss the possibility of real overinvestment in high-tech industries. We claim that investing 
in the industry gives agents an option to sell the project on the stock market at an overvalued 
price enabling then the financing of positive NPV projects which would not be undertaken 
otherwise. It is shown that the IPO market can however also lead to overinvestment in new 
industries. Finally, we present some econometric results supporting the idea that funds 
committed to the financing of high-tech industries may respond positively to optimistic stock 
market valuations. 
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 1 Introduction
Investment in high technology industries, although representing a small part of GDP,
plays a major role in the performance of the economy by promoting innovation. Now,
many economists claim that having a market-based ﬁnancial system is the best way of
encouraging investment in emerging industries and several studies show that the presence
of a vibrant stock market is a necessary condition to ﬁnance projects characterized by
poor collateral value and highly uncertain returns. For example, Carpenter and Petersen
(2002) for the US or Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002) for Europe ﬁnd that high-tech ﬁrms
going public are experiencing a substantial increase in capital expenditures and size in
the immediate period following their IPO (Initial Public Oﬀering). In addition, the stock
market constitutes a very proﬁtable exit way for the venture capitalism industry. As
noted by Lerner (1994), venture capitalists generate the main part of their proﬁts from
ﬁr m ss o l do nt h es t o c km a r k e tv i aa nI P O . 1 Having an active IPO market is then critical
to the existence of a well developed venture capitalism industry (see Black and Gilson,
1998) and so to the adoption of high-tech technologies (Michelacci and Suarez, 2003). In
this vein, the set up of the “New Markets” in several European countries during the second
half of the nineties was aimed at welcoming young ﬁrms in new industries and then at
supporting entrepreneurship and innovation.2
Periods of strong activity on the IPO market are however usually associated with
excessively optimistic market sentiment. The recent frenzy over Internet ﬁrms is not
unique. It is well recognized that on average new industries IPOs underperform in the
long-run (Ritter, 1991) whereas they initially exhibit high returns, known as initial returns
or underpricing. Moreover, we know that periods of high IPO volume generally correspond
with periods of high initial returns, a proxy for investors’ sentiment. Such periods, called
hot issue periods have been repeated in the US several times with varying degrees during
the forty past years. Issuers would then take advantage of a window of opportunity by
1A Venture Economics study cited by Lerner ﬁn d st h a to na v e r a g e ,a ni n v e s t m e n to f$ 1i na
ﬁrm that is taken public provides a return to the venture capitalist of $1.95 beyond the initial
investment with an average holding period of 4.2 years.
2For a description and an analysis of European new stock markets, see Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002).
2selling stocks to overly optimistic investors, what seems conﬁrmed by empirical studies
which show that ﬁrms in a particular industry are more likely to go public when industry
valuations are the highest.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we develop a model of IPO timing in an
overvaluation context. This allows us to derive the value of the ﬁrm to its owner when
the issue market is hot and then to discuss in a second stage the role played by the IPO
market in the decision to invest in new industries and the possibility of real overinvestment
in such industries.
Few theoretical models have studied the dynamics of IPOs cycles in an overvaluation
framework. Benveniste, Busaba and Wilhelm (2002) develop a model where the clustering
of IPOs of a similar industry results from a decrease in the information production costs
related to ﬁrms’ industry prospects.3 The approach used by these authors, by considering
that secondary market prices reﬂect the true value of ﬁrms taken public, is nevertheless at
odds with the well-documented long-run underperformance of IPOs. Here, we make the
assumption that IPOs are temporarily overvalued because of heterogeneous beliefs among
potential investors on the stock market and short-sale constraints. Before the IPO the
ﬁrm is held by two agents: an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist. Going public enables
the entrepreneur to ﬁnance the growth of the ﬁrm by issuing new shares whereas it allows
the venture capitalist to sell his participations in the ﬁrm a few months after the IPO.
With both proﬁts of the project and a number of optimistic investors being stochastic,
the optimal timing of the IPO is derived by considering the going public decision as a real
option.4 More precisely, it is shown that the IPO option is exercised after positive shocks
on the number of optimists. Because in practice initial returns increase with the demand
3Underpricing is deﬁned as the return of the stock between the oﬀer price and the closing price
of the ﬁrst trading day — assumed in this model to reﬂe c tt h et r u ev a l u eo ft h eﬁrm. It is a
compensation received by institutional investors for their production of information about the value
of the stock and their truthful revelation of this value to the investment bank and the issuer
(Benveniste and Spindt, 1989). As the number of IPOs increases, the production of information
related to a common factor (namely, the industry factor) decreases and so underpricing, leading
more ﬁr m st og op u b l i c .
4Draho (2000) has ﬁrst analysed IPO timing in a real option framework. In his model, investors
on the stock market are supposed to be better diversiﬁed than the entrepreneur so that this latter
discounts the revenues of the ﬁrm at a higher rate than do public investors. With proﬁts evolving
stochastically, the ﬁrm is taken public only when the market valuation is suﬃciently larger than
the entrepreneur’s one, explaining why IPOs cluster around market peaks. This model is however
enable to account for IPOs long run underperformance.
3from optimistic investors, the model provides an explanation for the observed positive
causality between average initial returns and IPO volume.
Since projects are sold on the stock market at an overvalued price, one can wonder
about the eﬃciency of the stock market in allocating capital to proﬁtable investments.
The link between the stock market and real investment has been extensively studied in
economics and empirical works have concluded that the stock market had poor incidence
on real investment (see for e.g. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Blanchard, Rhee and
Summers, 1993; Bond and Cummins, 2000; among others) so that there was no reason
to worry about the consequences of stock market misvaluations on real economy. These
studies however focus on investment behavior of ﬁrms that are generally listed on the
stock market for a long time and which may not be ﬁnancially constrained. Moreover,
they do not consider the eﬀects of overvaluation on the decision to undertake a project
before going public. We argue in this paper that overvaluation, which is a characteristic
feature of the IPO market, can have beneﬁcial eﬀects on investment in emerging industries
up to a certain point. Indeed, when the IPO market is hot, investing in the industry gives
agents the option of selling projects to public investors at an attractive price, enabling then
the ﬁnancing of positive NPV projects which would not be undertaken otherwise simply
because of both uncertainty and irreversibility (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). However,
when the hot market lasts too long, overinvestment occurs in the industry in vogue on the
stock market whereas there is underinvestment in other promising industries not as much
popular in the investors’ community. Finally, we study the relation between the willingness
of private investors to ﬁnance high-tech industries and optimistic investors demand on the
IPO market by estimating an Error Correction Model (ECM) on quarterly data on the
US venture capitalism industry for the period of 1990:1-2002:4. Results support the main
idea of the paper, namely that funds committed to the ﬁnancing of high-tech projects and
so investments, are positively related in the long-run with the public market sentiment,
what may lead to overinvestment in new industries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of the
model. Section 3 derives the optimal IPO timing. In section 4, we discuss the eﬀects of
the going public option on real investment decisions. Empirical analysis is presented in
section 5. Section 6 concludes.
42T h e m o d e l
We consider the emergence of a new industry in the economy. To be implemented, each
project of this industry requires an investment cost I and generates a proﬁt ﬂow πt with
an initial proﬁtl e v e lπ0 > 0. The fundamental value of the project is simply deﬁned as the
expected present discounted value of the proﬁt ﬂow and is denoted Vt. We suppose that
entrepreneurs who are at the origin of the project’s idea have no funds so that they must
ﬁnd an agent in the economy who accepts to provide ﬁnancing in return for a participation
in the fundamental value of the project. Let us call this agent a venture capitalist.5 We
denote QS the quantity of shares initially composing the capital of the ﬁrm. By paying
I at date t, the venture capitalist receives θQS shares with 0 < θ < 1,t h a ti sa ne q u i t y
stake whose expected value is θVt. Once the investment is undertaken, the project can be
taken public on the stock market at any time with no delays to simplify. Going public
enables the ﬁrm to issue a ﬁxed quantity Q of new shares whereas it allows the venture
capitalist to resell his θQS shares on the stock market a speciﬁed period of time after the
IPO, called the lockup period.6
The proceeds of the issue are used by the entrepreneur to ﬁnance new investments or
marketing expenditures in order to grab industry market shares. It is however assumed
that these investments or expenditures have not a suﬃciently large impact on the value of
the ﬁrm to avoid a dilution of proﬁts.
Assumption 1 The initial public oﬀering entails a dilution cost for pre-IPO owners due
to an increase in the number of shares and a less proportional increase in the proﬁts of the
project.
Consistent with this assumption, several studies (Jain and Kini, 1994; Bottazzi and Da
R i n ,2 0 0 2 )d o c u m e n tad r o pi nt h ep r o ﬁtability of ﬁrms going public, mainly because of
5The contribution of the venture capitalist to the project goes of course beyond the ﬁnancial
investment I as he will also use his business expertise to achieve the fundamental value V .T h i s
latter characteristic makes the venture capitalist ﬁnancing a very appropriate one particularly in
high-tech industries, in comparison with a common ﬁnancing.
6In practice, insiders and other pre-IPO shareholders are generally prohibited from selling their
own shares at the IPO date particularly when the ﬁrm is young and belongs to a new industry.
Instead, they have to wait for a ﬁxed period of time which typically lasts six months. Gompers
and Lerner (1998) note that even after the expiration of the lockup, venture capitalists continue
to hold their equity stakes for several months. Here, we assume to simplify that these stocks
are distributed at the end of the lockup to the limited partners of the funds who in turn sell
them on the stock market.
5ineﬃcient investments (ceteris paribus, post-IPO proﬁts do not grow as much as assets).
Without loss of generality, we will assume here that the fundamental value of the ﬁrm is
not aﬀected by the new investments ﬁnanced by the issue of the Q primary shares. This
will greatly simplify the exposition of the model. We further suppose that the venture
capitalist anticipates this and so knows that the IPO entails a dilution cost. He always
prefers selling his θQS shares on the secondary market at the lockup expiration date
whereas the entrepreneur, more conﬁdent about the success of the ﬁrm strategy, keeps his
stake in the ﬁrm for an undetermined period of time. Empirical studies show indeed that
venture capitalists (or VC funds limited partners) do liquidate their participation around
the lockup expiration date whereas entrepreneurs generally keep their shares (see Schultz
and Zaman, 2001).
2.1 Industry description and fundamental valuation
Proﬁts of the project, denoted π, are supposed to follow the geometric Brownian motion:
dπt
πt
= απdt + σπdzπ,( 1 )
where απ < 0 and σπ are constant parameters and dzπ is the increment of a standard
Wiener process. The assumption relative to the drift’s sign is commonly used to describe
the evolution of proﬁts in high technology industries. As noted by McDonald and Siegel
(1986), when a new product is introduced by a ﬁrm, other ﬁrms introduce similar products
and so, because of lagged entry in the industry, proﬁts tend to disappear. This means
there is enough competition in the industry, what seems quite realistic for high-tech and
communication industries (see for instance Huisman, 2001). For a given level of proﬁts πt,
the conditional expectation for proﬁts at date s is
E [πs | πt]=πte
απ(s−t). (2)
Agents are risk averse. Discounting expected proﬁts at the appropriate risk-adjusted rate
ρ > 0, they value the project at date t,a t
Vt = E
·Z ∞
t
πse
−ρ(s−t)ds | πt
¸
=
Z ∞
t
πte
−(ρ−απ)(s−t)ds =
πt
ρ − απ
. (3)
Let us deﬁne δπ = ρ − απ > 0 and rewrite (3) as:
Vt =
πt
δπ
. (4)
62.2 Stock market prices
Following Miller (1977), we consider that stock prices are prone to overvaluation due
to both divergence of opinion and short-sale constraints. Indeed, ﬁrms going public
are generally operating in new industries so that uncertainty about future proﬁts is
high. Because uncertainty and divergence of opinion are likely to be correlated7,ah i g h
heterogeneity of beliefs concerning the return of ﬁrms taken public is observed. With
short-sale constraints, the market price is determined by the most optimistic investors,
leading to an overvaluation of the stock. Several papers have provided support for Miller’s
theory. For example, Boehme, Danielsen and Sorescu (2002) ﬁnd that shares which are
diﬃcult to borrow and are prone to a high dispersion of investors opinion underperform in
the long run.8 Ofek and Richardson (2003) report that Internet stocks were abnormally
costly to short whereas they were owned relatively more often by retail investors, a class
of investors considered as the more likely to be optimistic.
Here we consider two types of investors. First, rational investors who estimate the
project at the fundamental value V as do the venture capitalist. Next, optimistic investors9
whose valuations are greater than V . Rational and optimistic investors use the same
geometric Brownian motion (1) in their estimate of the value of the project but optimists
anticipate that proﬁts of a particular ﬁrm will experience an upward jump with a non-null
probability at a future unknown date.10 They behave as if they were investing in the next
Microsoft. This has for consequence to increase the expected trend of the diﬀusion process
of proﬁts and so the valuation of the project. As each optimistic investor has diﬀerent
estimates of the probability of the positive Poisson event and/or of the size of the jump, we
observe divergence of opinions even among this class of investors. For simplicity, we assume
that each optimistic investor, generally associated to small, unsophisticated investors, can
7As Miller notes: “it is implausible to assume that although the future is very uncertain, and
forecasts are very diﬃcult to make, that somehow everyone makes identical estimates of the return
and risk from every security”.
8The authors ﬁnd that there is overvaluation only when the stock is both diﬃcult to sell short
and is prone to divergence of opinion. Indeed, stocks with a great dispersion of investors opinion
are not necessarily overpriced as soon as the cost of short selling is not prohibitive. Symmetrically,
when short-sales are costly but there is little disagreement among investors about the value of the
stock, there is no overvaluation.
9One could also consider the existence of pessimistic investors. However, because rational investors
(typically associated to institutional investors) have suﬃcient resources to buy all the stocks at V ,
the presence of pessimistic investors will have no eﬀect on the determination of market prices.
10Of course this positive event never occurs and that’s why these investors are considered as optimistic.
7buy only one share. Finally, since we are interested in hot issue periods, it is supposed
that the number of optimistic investors is always greater than the number of stocks issued
so that the marginal investor is always an optimist and the price is overvalued.11
As a result of dispersion of opinion and short-sale constraints the demand curve slopes
down. However, contrary to preceding models considering IPO stock pricing in an
heterogeneous beliefs and short-sale constraints framework (see Ljungqvist, Nanda and
Singh, 2001 or Aggarwal, Krigman and Womack, 2002), the absolute value of the slope
of the demand curve is not supposed to be constant but decreasing with the number of
shares. In other words, when the quantity of shares sold on the market increases, the
price decreases but to a smaller and smaller extent. This is because as we get closer to
the fundamental value, there are more and more potential investors willing to pay for
the current price. This is a reasonable hypoth e s i sa st h ed i s t r i b u t i o no ft h en u m b e ro f
potential investors around the fundamental value may look like a shaped-bell curve rather
than being uniform. Overall, the appropriate price curve is not a straight line but an
hyperbola (see Figure 1). It is further assumed that as the number of optimistic investors
increases, divergence of opinion gets higher.
B e f o r et h eI P O ,t h et o t a ln u m b e ro fs h a r e si sQS, the quantity of secondary shares held
by the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. The initial public oﬀering consists in an
increase in the capital of the ﬁrm to Q+QS,w h e r eQ denotes the number of primary shares
issued at the time of the oﬀer. All proﬁts are paid out as dividends to the shareholders,
that is the initial owners of the ﬁrm (the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist) and
the new shareholders from the IPO. The fundamental component of the stock at date t is
then Vt
Q+QS. The overvalued part of the stock price is a convex decreasing function of the
quantity of shares issued and increases with the number of optimistic investors. Let us
s u p p o s ef o rs i m p l i c i t yt h a ti ti se q u a lt ont
Q,w h e r ent is the number of optimistic investors
at date t. Overall, with an IPO occurring at t, the market price at the end of the ﬁrst
trading day is
Pt =
Vt
Q + QS
+
nt
Q
. (5)
11Is is common to observe during hot issue periods substantial oversubscription ratios for high-tech IPOs.
8Figure 1. Distribution of the number of potential investors and corresponding price curve.
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1.1 shows the distribution of the number of potential investors: the closer the reservation price to the fundamental
value, the greater the observed number of potential investors. 1.2 plots the corresponding price curve sloping down
in a convex manner. An increase in the number of optimistic investors will shift the curve outwards.
T h en u m b e ro fo p t i m i s t i ci n v e s t o r s ,nt is supposed to follow a mixed Poisson-Wiener
process of the form:
dnt
nt
= αndt + σndzn − dq,( 6 )
where αn > 0 and
dq =
½
1 with probability λdt,
0 with probability 1 − λdt.
The positive sign of the drift parameter comes from a contagion eﬀect among
unsophisticated investors.12 The aim of the inclusion of the Poisson process is to take
into account the possibility of a crash. Indeed, if the Poisson event occurs, the number of
optimistic investors falls to zero where it remains forever, as zero is a natural absorbing
barrier for geometric Brownian motions. Optimistic investors have deﬁnitively disappeared
and this is the end of the hot market.
12Individual investors are considered as infrequent traders, explaining partly why they are unsophisticated
in comparison with professional investors. At a given date, some of them may not participate
o nt h eI P Om a r k e tb u tw i l lo n l ye n t e ra st i m eg o e sb yd u et oat r e n de ﬀect.
93T h e t i m i n g o f t h e I P O
Several empirical studies have stressed the ability of issuers to time their initial public
oﬀering in favorable market valuations conditions (see for instance, Lerner, 1994 or Pagano,
Panetta and Zingales, 1998). Following Draho (2000), the IPO timing is here modelled as
a real option. For this, we suppose that the IPO is irreversible. Besides, because as noted
by Lerner (1994) venture capitalists can use control rights and board seats to insure that
the IPO occurs at the time they consider as optimal, the optimal decision of when to go
public is derived from the venture capitalist’s utility.13
We assume to simplify that there is no underpricing. The oﬀe rp r i c ei st h e ne q u a lt o
the market price observed the day of the oﬀer. The decision to go public will depend on
the diﬀerence between the value of the shares to the venture capitalist when the ﬁrm is
private (continuation payoﬀ) and the value of these shares when the ﬁrm is taken public
(termination payoﬀ).
As long as the ﬁrm remains private, the venture capitalist gets at date t af r a c t i o nθ of
the proﬁts ﬂow generated by the project. However if the ﬁrm is taken public, the proﬁts
ﬂow must not only be shared with the entrepreneur but also with the new shareholders.
Then, the going public decision entails an indirect cost for the original owners of the ﬁrm
due to a dilution eﬀect (see Assumption 1). On the other side, it enables the venture
capitalist to sell the θQS shares at an overvalued price at the end of the lockup if the
market is still bullish. With a lockup period of length T, the expected market price at the
end of the lockup is
E[Pt+T | πt,n t]=
E[Vt+T | πt]
Q + QS
+
E[nt+T | nt]
Q + θQS
. (7)
Notice that the overvalued component of the market price is aﬀe c t e db yt h es a l eo ft h eθQS
secondary shares which appear in the denominator of the second term on the right-hand
side of (7). This is corroborated by several empirical studies which show that stock prices
decline around lockup expiration dates, particularly for venture-backed IPOs (see Field
and Hanka, 2001; Bradley, Jordan, Roten and Yi, 2001; Ofek and Richardson, 2003).
13Pﬁrrmann, Wupperfeld and Lerner (1997) cite the case of the contract signed by the venture
capitalist Apex Investment Partners and the ﬁrm AccessLine: “Apex proposed several contract
provisions (...): punitive interest of dividend payments if the ﬁrm did not go public; the right
for the venture capitalist to ﬁre management if the ﬁrm did not go public by a certain date;
the ability for the venture capitalist to require AccessLine to repurchase their shares (...)”.
10Overall, the termination payoﬀ received by the venture capitalist by going public at t
is
Ω(πt,n t)=
θQS
Q + QS
πt
δπ
+
θQS
Q + θQS
nte
−(δn+λ)T,( 8 )
where δn = ρ − αn with ρ > αn − λ (see appendix).
It is composed of two terms. The ﬁrst one is what we call a fundamental component.
It is the sum of the present values of the expected proﬁts ﬂow accruing to the venture
capitalist between date t and t + T and the expected fundamental part of the price at
date t + T when secondary shares are sold. The second term is the expected discounted
overvalued component of the stock price at t + T times the number θQS of secondary
shares sold.
Let F(πt,n t) denote the value to the venture capitalist from owning the θQS shares
at date t. It is equal to the expected sum of the present value of the cumulated proﬁts
ﬂow received until the unknown optimal IPO date τ(π∗,n ∗) and the present value of the
termination payoﬀ Ω(π∗,n ∗),t h a ti s :
F(πt,n t)=E
"Z t+τ(π∗,n∗)
t
θπse
−ρ(s−t)ds + e
−ρτ(π∗,n∗)Ω(π
∗,n
∗) | πt,n t
#
. (9)
The objective of the VC is to ﬁnd the IPO date τ(π∗,n ∗) that maximizes (9). However,
with π and n evolving stochastically, τ(π∗,n ∗) is a random variable and so cannot be
determined ap r i o r i . Instead, the only way to resolve this optimal stopping problem is to
derive the critical values π∗ and n∗ that trigger the IPO (we are more precisely looking
for a threshold ratio n∗
π∗).
Over a small time interval dt, the state variables will have changed to (πt + dπt) and
(nt+dnt). In the continuation region, the value of the shares can be expressed as the sum
of the immediate proﬁts ﬂow and the discounted value of being private, that is:
F(πt,n t)=θπtdt +
1
1+ρdt
E [F(πt + dπt,n t + dnt) | πt,n t]. (10)
The Bellman equation for the optimal IPO timing strategy can then be written as:
F(πt,n t)=m a x
½
Ω(πt,n t), θπtdt +
1
1+ρdt
E [F (πt + dπt,n t + dnt) | πt,n t]
¾
. (11)
Because time horizon is inﬁnite and απ, σπ, αn, σn and λ are constants, one can drop the
t subscripts on π and n. In the continuation region, the second term on the right-hand
11side of (11) is the larger of the two. Let multiply it by (1+ρdt), omit terms that go faster
than dt as dt → 0 and rearrange, we get:
ρF(π,n)dt = θπdt + E [dF (π,n) | π,n],( 1 2 )
where
dF = Fπdπ + Fndn +
1
2
Fππ(dπ)
2 +
1
2
Fnn(dn)
2 + Fπn(dπdn)+[ F(π,0) − F(π,n)]dq (13)
by application of Itô’s Lemma, subscripts denoting derivatives.14
Note that if the Poisson event in (6) occurs, n goes to zero that is the market is cold
forever and the ﬁrm is never taken public. Then, the value of the ﬁrm consists merely of
the fundamental value π
δπ. This yields the following condition:
F(π,0) = θ
π
δπ
. (14)
Finally, taking the expectation of (13) where E [dzπ]=E [dzn]=0 , E [dq]=λdt,
E [dzπdq]=E [dzndq]=0and E [dzπdzn]=rdt, rearranging and dividing by dt,e q u a t i o n
(12) becomes the elliptic partial diﬀerential equation:
1
2
(σ
2
ππ
2Fππ +2 rσπσnπnFπn + σ
2
nn
2Fnn)+( ρ − δπ)πFπ
+( ρ − δn)nFn − (ρ + λ)F +
µ
δπ + λ
δπ
¶
θπ =0 . (15)
Besides (14) the solution to (15) must satisfy the standard value-matching and two smooth-
pasting conditions, respectively:
F(π,n)=
θQS
Q + QS
π
δπ
+
θQS
Q + θQS
ne
−(δn+λ)T, (16)
Fπ(π,n)=
θQS
Q + QS
1
δπ
, (17)
Fn(π,n)=
θQS
Q + θQS
e
−(δn+λ)T. (18)
Solving this kind of problem generally requires the use of numerical methods. However,
following McDonald and Siegel (1986) or Dixit and Pindyck (1994) we can reduce it to
14Equation (12) is the usual equilibrium relation which states that over the small time interval
dt, the total expected return from holding the shares must be equal to the proﬁts ﬂow θπdt
plus the expected capital appreciation.
12one dimension. Indeed, because F(π,n) is homogeneous of degree one in (π,n) we can
rewrite the value of the option as:
F(π,n)=πf
³n
π
´
= πf(s). (19)
The function f and the critical value of the ratio s = n
π are then obtained using the
standard optimal stopping problem method. Intuitively, the ﬁrm should go public when
the dilution cost is relatively low, that is when π is low or when the number of optimistic
investors is relatively high. Overall, IPO occurs when s is suﬃciently high.
Proposition 1 With proﬁts of the project and a number of optimistic investors following
respectively the stochastic processes (1) and (6), the ﬁr mi st a k e np u b l i cw h e nt h er a t i o
s = n
π is greater than the threshold value
n∗
π∗ = s
∗ =
ε1
ε1 − 1
Q(Q + θQS)
δπQS(Q + QS)
e
(δn+λ)T (20)
where
ε1 = 1
2 − δπ−δn
σ2
π−2rσnσπ+σ2
n +
rh
δπ−δn
σ2
π−2rσnσπ+σ2
n
i2
+
2(δπ+λ)
σ2
π−2rσnσπ+σ2
n > 1. (21)
The value of the ﬁrm to the venture capitalist is
F(π,n)=A1
nε1
πε1−1 + θ
π
δπ
. (22)
A1 is given in appendix.
Proof: see appendix
The venture capitalist will then exercise the IPO option in particular after a positive
shock on the number of optimistic investors n. This yields the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Holding the proﬁt level constant, ﬁrms should go public after positive
shocks on the number of optimistic investors.
Several papers have documented a positive relation between initial returns and the
demand from retail investors. For example, Derrien (2002) ﬁnds from a sample of french
IPOs, that the oﬀer price as well as the initial return increase with the demand of individual
investors.15 Similarly for the US, using the TAQ database Zhang (2000) identiﬁes the
15There exists in France an IPO procedure commonly used since 1999 which reserves a fraction
of oﬀered shares for individual investors. The demand from these investors is hence directly observable.
13buying volume generated by small investors during the ﬁrst trading day of the IPO and
ﬁnds that underpricing is positively related to this volume. Finally, it is well recognized
in the IPO literature that initial returns are positively and very signiﬁcantly explained by
stock market returns preceding the date of the oﬀer (see Loughran and Ritter, 2002 or
Derrien and Womack, 2003, among others). As evidenced by Derrien (2002), this is because
market conditions have an impact on the demand of individual or optimistic investors,
even in the few days before the IPO. Overall, high initial returns may be interpreted as a
high level of optimists demand. Proposition 2 is then highly consistent with Lowry and
Schwert’s (2002) study which shows that past initial returns positively Granger cause the
number of IPOs. More precisely, the Granger F-test rejects with a p-value below 1% the
hypothesis that three lags of monthly average initial returns have no power to predict the
number of IPOs. This means that ﬁrms are going public when average underpricing is high
t h a ti sw h e nt h ed e m a n df r o mo p t i m i s t i ci n v e s t o r si sh i g h .S i n c ei np r a c t i c et h eo p t i o no f
going public cannot be exercised instantaneously because of the oﬀer registration period,
a lag is observed between the increase in the number of optimistic investors and the rise
in IPO volume.16
Notice that an increase in the probability of the Poisson event has two opposite eﬀects
on the IPO timing. First, a positive one. Indeed, the higher the probability λ of the
negative event, the less valuable the option as E [dn] decreases and so the ﬁrm should go
public earlier. Second, a negative eﬀect. Since the overvalued part of the proceeds from
selling secondary shares is not received for T units of time, when λ increases, the venture
capitalist will wait for a higher threshold ratio to take the ﬁrm public. It can also be
noted that the value of the option is decreasing with the lockup duration T and that not
surprisingly, as T goes to inﬁnity F(π,n) reduces to the fundamental value of the shares
since A1 in (22) goes to zero. The determination of the lockup period’s length by stock
market authorities may then have non negligible eﬀects on the venture capitalism industry
equilibrium.17
So far, we have considered the IPO timing decision by assuming that the ﬁrm faced
16Introducing a lag between the going public decision and the date of the IPO would not modify
the results of the model. It would only raise the critical value s
∗ beyond which the issuer decides to go public.
17Venture capitalists rarely sell stocks on the stock market to then distribute cash to limited
partners. Instead, they prefer distributing the shares to each limited partner who can decides
when selling the stocks. Anyway, as long as the distribution of stocks occurs after the lockup
period, the length of this period undeniably aﬀects the venture capitalism industry equilibrium.
14competition on the product market but enjoyed a monopolistic position on the IPO market.
However, when the market is bullish, other ﬁrms in the same industry will be taken public
and one might expect that the number of optimistic investors for each issuer gets down,
leading to a decrease in initial returns and subsequent IPO volume. Econometric results
does not however support this last assertion. As evidenced by Lowry and Schwert, the
number of IPOs has no power to predict future initial returns. This could be because of
bottlenecks on the oﬀer side of the IPO market, as the investment bank industry cannot
instantaneously adjust its size to a sudden increase in the demand for its services and
the Security and Exchange Commission is unable to process the registration statements
as quickly as in normal periods.18 As a result, it may be that the number of optimistic
investors present the ﬁr s td a yo ft h eo ﬀer (the variable n in the model) increases at a higher
rate than do the number of IPOs and then, despite a larger quantity of stocks oﬀered to
investors, initial returns are still substantial.
4 IPO option and real investment
Shleifer (2000) points out that “when capital markets are not suﬃciently developed to
enable the ﬁnancing of all privately proﬁtable projects, bubbles play an extremely positive
social role”. Indeed, “overvaluation may enable ﬁrms to ﬁnance proﬁtable projects that
they could not ﬁnance otherwise because of imperfections in the capital markets”. In this
section, we show that the IPO market may be a good illustration of Shleifer’s intuition.19
First, let us consider the investment decision of the venture capitalist when there is no
IPO market. At date τ, the venture capitalist can pay I to get a payoﬀ which is worth
θVτ where Vτ is the expected cumulated proﬁts ﬂow of the project, deﬁn e da si n( 3 ) .S i n c e
proﬁts and so, the project value, are expected to decrease over time, the optimal timing
strategy clearly consists in investing immediately, provided that the current value Vτ lies
above a given critical level noted V ∗, that is that the investment option is deep in the
money. V ∗ can be calculated by using the basic investment model under uncertainty.
18Lowry and Schwert report that high initial returns are associated with longer registration periods in
following months. Without considering bottlenecks eﬀects, this ﬁnding may seem quite paradoxical
as potential issuers interpret high initial returns as a signal of a high level of optimistic demand
and so should exercice their IPO option more quickly.
19Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2001) also note concerning the IPO market that since “the possible
expropriation of sentiment investors (...) subsidizes risk-taking by young ﬁrms, social welfare may be enhanced”.
15Let t denote a date when the investment option is out the money (that is Vt <V∗)a n d
Ψ(πt) the termination payoﬀ received by the VC when investing I at date t.W eh a v e :
Ψ(πt)=θ
πt
δπ
− I. (23)
The program of the venture capitalist can be stated as follows:
H(πt)=m a x
½
Ψ(πt),
1
1+ρdt
E [H (πt + dπt) | πt]
¾
, (24)
where H(πt) is the value of the investment opportunity without IPO market.
The only return from holding the investment opportunity is its expected appreciation.
In the continuation region, the Bellman equation is then:
ρH(πt)dt = E[dH(πt) | πt]. (25)
Once again, we can drop the t subscripts on π since the problem is time homogeneous.
Expanding dH using Itô’s Lemma, taking its expected value by noting that E(dzπ)=0 ,
E(dz2
π)=dt and dividing by dt, (25) becomes:
1
2
σ
2
ππ
2H
00(π)+( ρ − δπ)πH
0(π) − ρH(π)=0 . (26)
It must be stressed that with απ negative, this relation can be used only for speciﬁc
values of the drift and the variance parameters. Indeed, the value of waiting comes from
the possibility for the VC not to undertake the project in case of a negative shock on
proﬁts. The larger the variance parameter of the proﬁts ﬂow, the higher this value. On
the other hand, when the drift parameter is negative, waiting entails a cost not only
because of the foregone proﬁts ﬂows but also because V is expected to decline over time.
O v e r a l l ,o n em u s ts u p p o s et h a tαπ is not too low in comparison with the variance σ2
π
otherwise E[dH(π) | π] would be negative and there would be no waiting region. This is
summarized in the following assumption:
Assumption 2 The amplitude of shocks over proﬁts is suﬃciently large in comparison
with the drift so that there exists a waiting region. More precisely, απ and σ2
π are such
that the inequality:
1
2
σ
2
ππ
2H
00(π)+αππH
0(π) > 0
holds true, H(π) being a continuous convex function at least twice diﬀerentiable in π.
16Note that this hypothesis is more likely to be valid, ceteris paribus, in industries where
proﬁts are very volatile as this is the case in emerging industries. Resolving equation (26)
under the standard boundary conditions (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) gives the critical
value V ∗ of the project above which it is optimal to invest in the absence of the IPO
market.
Proposition 3 When proﬁts are expected to decline over time, the critical value of V
until which it is optimal to invest I is
V
∗ =
ξ1
ξ1 − 1
I
θ
(27)
with
ξ1 = 1
2 −
(ρ−δπ)
σ2
π +
rh
(ρ−δπ)
σ2
π − 1
2
i2
+
2ρ
σ2
π > 1. (28)
In the present case, the venture capitalist receives only a fraction θ of the value of the
project. Then, he will invest I at date τ if θVτ is greater than
θV
∗ =
ξ1
ξ1 − 1
I>I . (29)
Suppose that V0 is greater than V ∗, then agents enter the industry until an unknown date
t∗ when Vt∗ = V ∗. Note however that at V ∗ there are still positive NPV projects in the
industry which are not undertaken simply because of uncertainty over the evolution of
proﬁts.20 This is more likely to occur when the variance of returns is high.
Proposition 4 The higher the variance of the project’s returns, the greater the critical
value below which no investment will occur.
Proof follows from derivation of ξ1 with respect to σ2
π.
From a fundamental value perspective, if V is initially greater than V ∗, investment
in an industry will occur until the critical value V ∗ is hit. However, one can imagine
industries in the economy where V ∗ is so high that only a few project will be ﬁnanced,
despite the presence of other positive NPV projects. From proposition 4, this will happen
in industries where the variance of returns is large, that is in emerging industries.
20The fact that venture capitalists abstain from undertaking these positive NPV projects cannot
be viewed as suboptimal as it is the result of an optimal behavior once the opportunity cost
of exercising the option to invest is taken into account. One can however consider that this
situation is suboptimal for other agents in the economy as the implementation of these projects
may increase their utility. I thank Mark Wahrenburg for having stressed this point.
17Having the option to go public and so, the opportunity to sell the project at an
overvalued price can now enable the ﬁnancing of projects which would not be undertaken
otherwise.21 Indeed, in presence of optimistic investors, the value of the ﬁrm at date τ is
given by (22). Then, the venture capitalist will invest in the industry if
I<F (π,n)=A1
nε1
πε1−1 + θ
π
δπ
. (30)
Overvaluation on the stock market will be beneﬁcial to the economy if it enables the
implementation of projects with positive net present values. In the absence of the IPO
market, the region over which such projects are not ﬁnanced is larger, the higher the
variance of returns in the industry. But as the variance of returns increases, the evaluation
of projects is prone to a greater divergence of opinion and so (30) may hold. As long as
(30) holds, venture capitalists ﬁnance projects and sell them on the stock market.
If all positive NPV projects have been ﬁnanced and the IPO market is still hot (that
is the Poisson event in (6) has not yet occurred), venture capitalists may ﬁnd optimal to
undertake negative present value investments. In this case, overvaluation is harmful for
two reasons. First, because it leads to overinvestment in the industry (too many similar
projects are ﬁnanced) and then wasting of capital. Gompers and Lerner (2003) report
for example that in the early eighties, nineteen disk drive companies received venture
capital ﬁnancing and that two-thirds of these inve s t m e n t sc a m ei n1 9 8 2a n d1 9 8 3 ,ap e r i o d
when valuation of publicly traded computer hardware ﬁrms experienced a substantial
increase. Whereas the rationality of the scale of investment in the industry was highly
questionable, many of these companies went public, just before the market collapsed a few
month later. A similar dynamic was observed in the biotechnology industry in the early
nineties. The second reason why overvaluation is harmful is that positive NPV projects
in other industries will be unfunded.22 Indeed, the fundamental or real return of these
projects, even if signiﬁcant, may be lower than the ﬁnancial return received from the sale of
overvalued stocks if the number of optimistic investors n in (30) is very high, as it was the
case for Internet companies in the late nineties.
21Draho (2000) draws a similar conclusion but by only considering the ﬁnancing of projects whose
NPV would be negative in the absence of the IPO market.
22Gompers and Lerner note that during the IPO cycle of 1998-2000, investments were concentrated
in the sectors of Internet and telecommunication. Promising areas like energy technologies, micro
manufacturing or advanced materials were not funded as venture capitalists preferred allocating funds
to most popular investment areas.
185 Empirical analysis
The previous model suggests that venture capitalists or their limited partners may be
more willing to ﬁnance projects in new industries when the IPO market for these industries
is hot, that is when the demand from optimistic investors is high. Accordingly, we propose
in this section to test for a relation between the decision to invest in high-tech industries
and optimistic investors demand on the IPO market.
Funds invested by venture capitalists in private companies come essentially from
external investors, mainly pension funds, through commitments in venture closed-end
funds raised typically every two to ﬁve years. These funds are not immediately invested
in the portfolio companies but are instead disbursed in stages over several years. An
appropriate measure of the willingness of agents to invest in a given industry may then be
the amount of commitments to venture funds targeted towards this industry rather than
the amount of funds actually disbursed in companies.
Several papers have already studied the relation between IPO market activity and
venture capital fundraising. Gompers and Lerner (1998) have found that the equity value
of venture backed ﬁrms taken public in the previous year had a positive eﬀect on current
fundraising. Gompers (1996) has also showed that the number of ﬁrms taken public by a
venture capitalist had a signiﬁcant impact on the amount of capital this VC could raise in
next funds, particularly when it is a young VC. Indeed, bringing companies public enables
the VC to increase its reputation and hence to raise new funds more easily (grandstanding
hypothesis). However, in Gompers’ study the initial return of the IPO backed by the VC
does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on future fundraising.
Here we follow a diﬀerent approach from these papers by analyzing the impact on
fundraising of average initial returns, which may represent a proxy for optimistic investors
demand on the IPO market. We argue that when average initial returns for a given
industry are high, rational investors expect that future IPOs of this industry will also
exhibit high initial returns and so a good performance until the end of the lockup.23 They
are hence more willing to commit money for the ﬁnancing of projects of this industry.
23Aggarwal, Krigman and Womack (2002) show that the buy-and-hold return from the IPO date
t ot h el o c k u pe x p i r a t i o nd a t ei n c r e a s e sw i t ht h ei n i t i a lr e t u r no ft h es t o c kc o n s i d e r e dv i am o r e
recommendations from ﬁnancial analysts.
195.1 Data and variable description
For the conduct of our econometric study we use US quarterly series of commitments
and venture investments in high-tech industries over the period 1990:1-2002:4. Data
are obtained from Venture Economics.24 The analysis is restricted to investments by
venture capitalists funds in private ﬁrms and ﬁr m sw h i c ha r ei na nI P Or e g i s t r a t i o np e r i o d
(investments in public ﬁrms are not included). Moreover, buy-out as well as acquisition
investments are excluded. Finally, funds of funds (venture funds that invest more than
50% of their capital in other venture funds) are also eliminated.
Concerning average initial returns, we rely on a sample of ﬁrm-commitment IPOs
completed between 1990 and 2002 which are reported by the New Issues database of
Securities Data Company (SDC). IPOs of the sample meet several criteria. Unit oﬀerings,
partnerships, American Depository Receipts (ADRs) or non-common shares and penny
stocks (stocks with an oﬀer price below $5) are eliminated. Moreover, only AMEX, NYSE
and NASDAQ IPOs in high-tech industries are considered.25 First-day trading prices are
obtained from SDC or, if not reported by this database, from Datastream. If the closing
p r i c ea tt h eﬁrst-trading day is not available (concerns a total of 21 IPOs), we use the
closing price at the second-trading day after the IPO or the close at the end of the ﬁrst
week of trading. We lost 9 IPOs for which we could not get market prices. The ﬁnal
sample is then composed of 1,602 IPOs.
As in Blondel, Hoang, Powell and Shi (2001), we compute for each quarter a proceeds-
weighted measure of initial return instead of a simple arithmetic average measure. Indeed,
ﬁrms which are raising smaller amounts of money generally exhibit higher initial returns
ceteris paribus. Equal-weighted initial returns would then give a misleading measure of
optimistic investors demand. Proceeds-weighted initial returns are given by the following
24This database deﬁnes high-technology investments as those in communications and media, Internet,
computer hardware, computer other, semiconductors and other electronics industries.
25High-tech IPOs are here deﬁned as those with SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578 (computer
hardware), 3661, 3663, 3669 (communications equipment), 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3678, 3679 (electronics
components and accessories), 3812, 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827 (search, detection, navigation, guidance),
3829 (measuring and controlling devices), 4812, 4813 (telephone equipment), 4899 (communications
services), 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, 7379 (software) and 7389 (Internet business services).
We also considered IPOs with SIC codes 3559 (special industry machinery), 5045, 5065, 5199, 5261,
5311, 5734, 5735, 5941, 5945, 5961, 5991, 5999 (wholesale) when related to computers, software or Internet.
20formula:
IRt =
N P
i=1
{(proceeds)i,t × IRi,t}
N P
i=1
(proceeds)i,t
× 100
where t = quarter 1,...,52 ; i = IPO 1,...,N where N denotes the number of IPOs in
quarter t ; (proceeds)i,t =( number of shares issued)i,t × (oﬀer price)i,t and IRi,t =[ ( ﬁrst-
trading day closing price)i,t − (oﬀer price)i,t] / (oﬀer price)i,t.
The three series — IR for proceeds-weighted initial returns, COM for commitments
and INV for investments — are plotted in Figure 2. As can be seen from this ﬁgure, the
evolution of commitments seems to follow with a lag of six months the evolution of initial
returns, particularly during the hot market of Internet IPOs. On the other hand, the series
of investments is smoother, reﬂecting the fact that capital in venture funds is disbursed
in stages. This leads to an hysteresis eﬀect that may explain why despite the collapse of
the bubble and the bearish market that prevails since then, venture investments remain
relatively high. Overall, these observations reinforce our intuition that a modelling of
commitments rather than investments is more appropriate to capture the eﬀects of public
market sentiment on private investors’ decisions to fund high-tech projects.
Figure 2. Quarterly proceeds-weighted initial returns (in percent), commitments and
investments (in millions of dollars) in high-tech industries for the period 1990:1-2002:4.
Note: there is no point for the series IR in 2002:3 since no IPO meeting our sample criteria occurred during this
quarter.
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Sources: Venture Economics and author’s calculations based on the New Issues SDC database.
21Finally, because of the stickiness of the supply of venture capital26,t h el e v e lo f
commitments may not adjust instantaneously to the IPO market sentiment. Instead of
using the series IR, we then rely on its two quarters lagged measure, denoted IRL (see
Figure 3).
Figure 3. Lagged quarterly proceeds-weighted initial returns (in percent) and commitments
(in millions of dollars) in high-tech industries for the period 1990:1-2002:4.
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5 . 2 U n i tr o o ta n dc o i n t e g r a t i o nt e s t s
Unit root tests results for the series IRL and COM are presented in Table 1. The
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) as well as the Phillips-Perron (PP) tests indicate that
the series IRL is a pure random walk (no time trend, no constant). For COM,t h eA D F
test leads us to accept the non-stationarity hypotheses only at the 1% level. Indeed, the
test suggests that the series is stationary around a trend at the 5% level. We however treat
these series as integrated of order one as the Phillips-Perron test fails to reject the null
hypothesis of non stationarity even at the 5% level (without any time trend or constant
term).
Since the two series are I(1), we test for the presence of a cointegrating relation using
the two-step Engle-Granger (1987) procedure. Accordingly, we ﬁrst estimate the following
26See Gompers and Lerner (2003) for the reasons of short-run rigidities in fundraising.
22Table 1.Unit root tests for the period 1990:1-2002:4.
Variable Null hypothesis Alternative hypothesis ADFa PPb
IRL I(1)
I(2)
I(0)
I(1)
−1.80
−9.37∗∗
−1.55
−9.37∗∗
COM I(1)
I(2)
I(0)
I(1)
−3.82∗
−3.46∗∗
−1.73
−9.80∗∗
a Augmented Dickey Fuller test with a number of lags minimizing Akaike and Schwartz information criteria.
b Phillips-Perron test with 3 truncation lags as suggested by the Newey-West criterion. ∗∗ and ∗ denote rejection
of the null hypothesis respectively at 1% and 5% signiﬁcance levels, based on MacKinnon critical values.
cointegrating regression:
COMt = a0 + a1 IRLt + zt. (31)
Then, we study the stochastic properties of the estimated residue ˆ zt.I fCOM and IRL
are cointegrated, ˆ z should be stationary in level. OLS estimation of equation (31) yields
the following results (t-statistics are in parentheses):
COMt =−1354.45
(−2.97)
+1 1 7 .7
(10.62)
IRLt +ˆ zt (32)
with sample size =5 2 ,A d j u s t e dR2 =0 .69 and DW =1 .54.
This equation, referred to as the static relation indicates that in the long-run, the level
of commitments is positively related to the level of lagged initial returns.
We however need to make sure that we are not in presence of a spurious regression.
At ﬁrst glance, the Durbin-Watson statistic shows that this is not the case. The value of
this statistic is indeed signiﬁcantly greater than the critical values tabulated by Engle and
Yoo (1987).27 A more reliable approach consists in testing for the non-stationarity of the
residuals of the cointegrating relation using the ADF test without any trend or constant
term. Results of the unit root test for ˆ z are presented in Table 2.
Table 2.Unit root test for the residuals of the static relation.
Variable Null hypothesis Alternative hypothesis ADFa
ˆ z I(1) I(0) −5.61∗∗
a Augmented Dickey Fuller Test performed with zero lag according to the minimization of Akaike and Schwartz
information criteria. ∗∗ denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% signiﬁcance level, based on Engle and
Yoo (1987) critical values.
27For a sample of 50 observations these values are 1.49, 1.03 and 0.83 at 1%, 5% and 10%
signiﬁcance levels respectively.
23As can be seen from this table, we strongly reject the hypothesis of non-stationarity of
the residuals, indicating that the series COM and IRLare cointegrated. This is conﬁrmed
by the Johansen (1988, 1991) tests28 whose results are presented in Table 3.
Table 3.Johansen’s cointegration tests.
Null hypothesis: Max. eigenvalue 1% critical Trace 1% critical
cointegration rank = r test-statistica value test-statistica value
r =0 3 1 .65∗∗ 20.20 37.33∗∗ 24.60
r ≤ 15 .69 12.97 5.69 12.97
∗∗denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% signiﬁcance level. a Tests performed by allowing for a constant in
the cointegrating relation but not in the VAR.
5.3 Error correction model
In order to characterize the adjustments towards the equilibrium relation (32), we
estimate an error correction model of the form29:
∆COMt = c + γˆ zt−1 +
l X
i=1
δ1,i∆COMt−i +
m X
j=0
δ2,j∆IRLt−j + εt (33)
where ∆ is the lag operator, ˆ zt−1 is the estimated error correction term from (32) and l and
m are the optimal numbers of lags for the lagged dependent and independent variables.
l and m are determined by proceeding in two stages. We ﬁrst select the optimal number
l that minimizes AIC and SIC in (33) by constraining all δ2,j coeﬃcients to zero. Then,
using the optimal order of δ1,i, we determine the optimal order of δ2,j once again according
to the minimization of AIC and SIC.
Estimation results30 are reported in Table 4. Notice that the coeﬃcient of the error
correction term is signiﬁcantly negative, indicating that in case of a deviation from the
long-run relation, the level of commitments is corrected back to this relation. As an
example, a drop in the demand from optimistic investors, that is a fall in the variable IRL
— as the one that occurred during the second half of 2000 — leads to an increase in the
28The variable COM is normalized to one in the cointegrating vector. The number of lags in
the VAR in levels is determined by minimizing Akaike and Schwartz information criteria.
29We have chosen to model short run adjustments with a single equation (ECM) rather than with
a vector form (VECM) as it would make no sense to explain past initial returns by current levels of commitments.
30A battery of tests was applied to the residuals of the model. We did not ﬁnd any autocorrelations
or ARCH eﬀects. However, the White (1980) test indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity.
24residue of the static relation that in turn implies a decrease in subsequent commitments.
Note also that variations in commitments, ∆COM positively depend on variations in
initial returns that occur up to six quarters before (recall that the variable IRL indicates
two quarters lagged initial returns). This tends to conﬁrm previous results by Gompers
and Lerner (1998) that the process of raising new funds in response to public market
movements may be quite long.31
Overall, the econometric analysis reveals that agents do react to IPO market sentiment
in their decision to provide funds for the ﬁnancing of high-tech investments. A candidate
explanation for this ﬁnding is that agents expect high VC returns when average initial
returns are high as an important part of venture funds’ returns depends on the proceeds
from sales to public optimistic investors of portfolio companies’ shares. Note that we
could also have included in the analysis demand side factors like R&D expenditures or
the number of patents, which are suspected to inﬂuence the level of VC fundraising.
However, because these variables are trend stationary, they have no place in a cointegration
approach.
Table 4.Error correction model estimates for the period 1990:1-2002:4.
Dependent variable
Regressors ∆COMt t-statisticsa p-valuesa
c −45.13 −0.29 0.7728
ˆ zt−1 −0.48 −3.77 0.0005
∆COMt−1 −0.31 −2.29 0.0268
∆COMt−2 0.18 1.26 0.2143
∆IRLt 42.39 4.65 0.0000
∆IRLt−1 −13.85 −0.97 0.3391
∆IRLt−2 30.85 1.19 0.2411
∆IRLt−3 35.70 2.43 0.0196
∆IRLt−4 32.14 1.99 0.0534
Number of observations = 52, Adjusted R2 =0 .69
a Using White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
It should be stressed that our explanation for the relation between IPO market activity
and venture capital fundraising diﬀers from the grandstanding hypothesis in that we
argue that agents commit money more easily to VC funds when average initial returns
31Raising money and closing a new fund takes on average one year. However, the period of
fundraising is shorter for more established venture capitalists and more generally during hot issue
periods.
25are high because they expect a more proﬁtable exit from their investment32 whereas the
grandstanding hypothesis states that agents are more willing to provide funds to young
venture capitalists when these latter have a suﬃcient record in terms of companies brought
to the market. These two explanations are nevertheless not mutually exclusive.
Anyway, because of a disconnection between real and ﬁnancial returns, overfunding in
new industries may occur. It would be interesting to estimate empirically to what extend
stock market overvaluation is welfare-enhancing in view of the ﬁnancing of proﬁtable
projects. We leave this open for further research.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we studied the eﬀect of the IPO market on the decision to invest in new
industries when investors on the stock market agree to disagree about the fundamental
value of ﬁrms taken public and short sales are constrained. Following Draho (2000), we
treated the IPO decision as a real option and showed that ﬁr m sw e r em o r el i k e l yt og o
public when overvaluation was high relatively to proﬁts, that is after price run-ups. Thanks
to a substantial value of the IPO option, stock market bubbles may aﬀect real investment
decisions in high-technology industries. As revealed by the econometric analysis, funds
allocated to the development of new industries may positively depend on exuberant beliefs
reﬂected here by the degree of average initial returns on the IPO market. Bubbles can
then be beneﬁcial in the sense that they enable the ﬁnancing of positive NPV projects
which would not be undertaken otherwise because of great uncertainty over proﬁts. On
the other side, excessive and durable overvaluation certainly leads to overinvestment, that
is investment in negative NPV projects in the industry in vogue on the stock market.
The social beneﬁts of having an active IPO market clearly depend on the magnitude and
occurrence of these overvaluation events.
32This supposes that the length of time between funding projects and selling them on the stock
market is not too long. This hypothesis seems justiﬁed, at least for the end of the nineties
in view of the very young age of Internet IPOs.
26Appendix
A.1 Derivation of the termination payoﬀ Ω(πt,nt).
With a total number of shares equal to Q + QS, the discounted value of the expected
ﬂow of proﬁts received by the venture capitalist between the IPO date t and the lockup
expiration date t + T is
θQS
Q + QS
πt
δπ
(1 − e
−δπT). (A1)
The expected market price at t + T is
E[Pt+T | πt,n t]=
E[Vt+T | πt]
Q + QS
+
nte(αn−λ)T
Q + θQS
, (A2)
where
E[Vt+T | πt]=E
·
E
·Z ∞
t+T
πse
−ρ(s−t−T)ds | πt+T
¸
| πt
¸
=
πt
δπ
e
απT. (A3)
Discounting (A2) at the rate ρ for length T, multiplying by the number of secondary shares
θQS and adding to (A1) yields:
Ω(πt,n t)=
θQS
Q + QS
πt
δπ
+
θQS
Q + θQS
nte
−(δn+λ)T. (A4)
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
With F(π,n)=πf
³n
π
´
= πf(s), we have:
Fn(π,n)=f0(s), Fπ(π,n)=f(s) − sf0(s),
Fnn(π,n)=
f00(s)
π
, Fππ(π,n)=
s2f00(s)
π
and Fπn(π,n)=−
sf00(s)
π
.
Substituting these expressions in the partial diﬀerential equation (15), dividing by π and
rearranging gives the ordinary diﬀerential equation for the function f(s):
1
2
(σ
2
π − 2rσnσπ + σ
2
n)s
2f
00(s)+( δπ − δn)sf
0(s) − (δπ + λ)f(s)+
µ
δπ + λ
δπ
¶
θ =0 . (A5)
The general solution of the homogeneous part of (A5) have the form:
f(s)=A1s
ε1 + A2s
ε2. (A6)
27Following Dixit and Pindyck (1994), it can be expressed as:
f(s)=As
ε. (A7)
The particular integral to (A5) is
θ
δπ
. Adding it to (A7) yields:
f(s)=As
ε +
θ
δπ
. (A8)
Substituting (A8) in (A5), we get the fundamental quadratic equation:
1
2
(σ
2
π − 2rσnσπ + σ
2
n)ε(ε − 1) + (δπ − δn)ε − (δπ + λ)=0 , (A9)
whose two roots are
ε1 = 1
2 − δπ−δn
σ2
π−2rσnσπ+σ2
n +
rh
δπ−δn
σ2
π−2rσnσπ+σ2
n
i2
+
2(δπ+λ)
σ2
π−2rσnσπ+σ2
n > 1
and
ε2 = 1
2 − δπ−δn
σ2
π−2rσnσπ+σ2
n −
rh
δπ−δn
σ2
π−2rσnσπ+σ2
n
i2
+
2(δπ+λ)
σ2
π−2rσnσπ+σ2
n < 0.
Moreover, note that from F(π,0) = θ
π
δπ
, f must satisfy:
f(0) =
θ
δπ
. (A10)
Because ε2 < 0,w em u s th a v eA2 =0 ,o t h e r w i s ea sn went to zero, f(s) would tend
to inﬁnity, which violates (A10). Finally, applying the value-matching and the smooth-
pasting conditions to f(s)=A1sε1 +
θ
δπ
yields the system:

 
 
A1sε1 +
θ
δπ
=
θQS
Q + QS
1
δπ
+
θQS
Q + θQS
se−(δn+λ)T
A1sε1ε1
s
=
θQS
Q + θQS
e−(δn+λ)T.
(A11)
Solving (A11) for s and A1 gives:
s
∗ =
ε1
ε1 − 1
Q(Q + θQS)
δπQS(Q + QS)
e
(δn+λ)T (A12)
and
A1 = θQ[δπ(ε1 − 1)(Q + QS)]
ε1−1
µ
QS
ε1Q(Q + θQS)
¶ε1
e
−ε1(δn+λ)T. (A13)
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